

carrying out a charge on the crowd using dogs and batons. Before this charge began, he considered it necessary to fire two shots with his pistol as a warning to the demonstrators storming down with stones. Nobody was injured. The use of the dogs in the charge was a failure. Two were beaten to death, and the scholars tried to burn one of the bodies. By using batons, the police succeeded in driving the crowd back, but when they returned to their vehicles, the rioters followed them. It seemed to Col. Kleingeld as if the crowd were under the impression that the police were running away. It is interesting to note that the newspaper report discussed in paragraph 3.5.8 contained the following sentences about this incident: "They (the police) moved back when the students marched towards them. Then the police formed a semi-circle and moved in with tear-gas and dogs. Students replied with stones and the police ran for shelter - at this point the police drew their guns and fired".

3.6.9 The reason why the crowd did not stop their demonstration but instead intensified it, was probably that they and their inciters were convinced that the police were not well armed, had already taken to their heels, and could be driven from the area. According to Col. Kleingeld, the stone-throwing increased in intensity, and almost every one of his men had by then been hit. Some of the multiple injuries were so serious that hospital treatment was required. The stone-throwing attacks also caused extensive damage to the vehicles. The evidence of the police is that at that stage the squad had been surrounded. One of the reporters agreed that the police were surrounded by the crowd, but said that it had happened only after the general shooting by the police. Other reporters denied that the police were surrounded, and some contended that the terrain was such that it would have been impossible for them to be surrounded. The Commission conducted an inspection in loco and established that it would have been possible for the crowd to surround the police squad there. After consideration of all the evidence, the statement made by the police was accepted.

3.6.10 As reinforcements had not yet arrived, Col. Kleingeld decided that in the circumstances he would have to use firearms. He was afraid, however, that indiscriminate shooting by others could result in a blood-bath, and therefore did not order his men to shoot but acted himself. As has been mentioned, he had already fired two warning shots earlier. In the new circumstances he

fired three more shots from his pistol in front of and over the crowd. This checked the rioters for only a moment, after which they advanced again. Thereupon several other members of the force also used their pistols or revolvers; the commanding officer is of the opinion that they acted out of desperation. Two members of the squad gave their account. One, a Black policeman, told the Commission how he had been attacked and held by a rioter; he fired a few revolver shots into the air, thus gaining an opportunity to free himself and get back to the vehicles. The other was Sergeant M.J. Hattingh, who was in command of the dogs. He did not give evidence before the Commission but made a sworn statement, which was submitted. His account fits in with the other events of the morning, but it is not used where it conflicts with the evidence of other persons who did testify before the Commission. His statement deals with the initial stone-throwing, the tear-gas attack, the charge with dogs and batons, and the fact that the crowd then again advanced on the police and the vehicles. He saw that other members of the squad had been injured, some seriously, and it was clear to him that the crowd was going to overpower them. He was hit on the leg by a stone and fell down on the ground. He heard an order to draw weapons and fire. Who gave this order he does not know; Col. Kleingeld said in evidence that he had given no such order. The sergeant stated that he heard the others firing and saw the colonel firing a number of shots towards the crowd. He got up and drew his firearm. A Black man charged at him with a brick in his left hand and a kierie in his right hand. To beat off the attack, he fired straight at the man. The attacker fell down dead. Later, he identified him at the mortuary. It was the 17-year-old Hastings Ndhlovu. The sergeant stated further that he fired five more shots at the legs of the charging crowd, but that he did not see anyone fall. Col. Kleingeld himself, after using his pistol, fired about 20 shots in a few bursts over and in front of the rioting crowd from an automatic rifle. A gap opened up in the crowd and he ordered his men to drive their vehicles at speed through the retreating rioters. When Sergeant Hattingh reached his vehicle, he found that the keys had been removed. He ran the vehicle down the slope, but when he turned from Vilakazi Street into Moema Street, it came to a stop. The crowd immediately closed in on the vehicle and severely damaged it with stones. They tried to drag him out of the vehicle, grabbed his cap and ripped the badges from his uniform. His hand was injured by a sharp object and an attempt was made to take his firearm from him. Col.

No name

Kleingeld drove the attackers off with bursts from the automatic rifle, and the sergeant and his vehicle were removed from the danger area. When he afterwards opened the rear door of the vehicle, he noticed a strong smell of paraffin. The reinforcements arrived, and all the police groups took up a position on the other side of Khumalo Street.

3.6.11 In assessing the danger in which the members of the force found themselves when Col. Kleingeld decided to use firearms, the inferences and opinions of the police witnesses cannot be ignored. On the strength of what he had seen sergeant Hattingh came to the conclusion that the crowd was going to overpower them. The Black policeman judged it necessary to fire shots into the air to frighten off his attacker. The commanding officer regarded their situation as critical and came to the conclusion that his men's lives were in danger before deciding to use firearms to lead the squad from danger to safety. In addition to this evidence, the Commission also took the following facts into consideration: The fact that the police were greatly outnumbered by the rioters; the sustained stone-throwing attacks and serious injuries; the mood of the crowd; the activities of the inciters; the abortive attempts to disperse the crowd with tear-gas, dogs and batons; and the fact that the crowd had surrounded the squad. The Commission feels that in all these circumstances the concern of those involved was not groundless; their lives were in danger.

3.6.12 There were great differences in the evidence on the connection between the shooting and the stone-throwing. The two extreme opposites may be stated as follows: The crowd threw stones because the police fired, or the police fired because the crowd threw stones. Various witnesses took up a position between these two extremes. A number of reporters testified that they saw stones being thrown only after the first shots had been fired. Some of them admitted that they had not been able to see everything that was happening, but others firmly maintained that the crowd had been peaceful and orderly until the police fired. After considering all the evidence on the events of that morning, the Commission cannot accept that the police used firearms when everything was still calm and peaceful. According to the newspaper report quoted in paragraph 3.6.8, the police first used tear-gas and dogs; the scholars responded to this with stones, and the police then fired. Miss

Sophie Tema's evidence is given in paragraph 3.6.7. According to her, a policeman threw a tear-gas grenade in among the scholars; this led to stone-throwing attacks on the part of the scholars, followed by rifle fire from the police. This sequence of events corresponds with Col. Kleingeld's account, except that he and other witnesses also mentioned stone-throwing before tear-gas was tried. Miss Tema did not see this, but nor did she see the charge, although she noticed a dead dog. After evaluating all the evidence the Commission accepts the following: On their arrival the police were taunted by the crowd and stones were thrown at them. After the use of tear-gas, the stone-throwing became fiercer, and Col. Kleingeld fired two warning shots and called for reinforcements. When the police turned back after the charge, they were surrounded on all sides by the crowd and stones were thrown at them. Because their lives were in danger, Col. Kleingeld tried to ward off the crowd with rifle fire. Without his having issued any order, his men also began firing in desperation. Sergeant Hattingh shot and killed Hastings Ndhlovu, who was charging at him. When the squad drove through the crowd to safety, rioters attacked one of the vehicles and attempted to set fire to it.

3.6.13 The way in which the police fired is another aspect of the events that must be discussed. Of the three policemen who described their own shooting, only Sergeant Hattingh said that he had aimed at people; one shot was intended to prevent an attack and the other five were aimed at the legs of people who were bearing down on him. The Black constable fired into the air and Col. Kleingeld's shots were directed over, past and in front of people to frighten them and drive them off. According to reporters, the police aimed at the pupils, or fired at them or shot straight at them. Elsewhere in this Report it is pointed out that, especially in a riotous situation, anyone who was some distance from a person who was shooting, would hardly be able to say with certainty whether such a person was aiming his shots at someone or not. The Commission is of the opinion that in this respect the witnesses were overstating their certainty. This observation also applies to the evidence on how often firearms were used and how many shots were fired. If the police had fired as much and in such a way as was reported in the evidence, the list of fatalities would have been much longer. It is impossible to say how many were wounded by firearms in the course of the morning. What is certain, however, is that only two demonstrators died in the rioting of that morning, and that

both were shot by the police. One of them was Hastings Ndhlovu, whose death has been described in paragraph 3.6.10. The other was a 12-year-old schoolboy, Hector Peterson. His case is dealt with in Annexure F, under the name of Hector Pieteron. From all the details it would seem that he was killed by a bullet not intended for him. There was no evidence to corroborate a newspaper report that he was shot and killed in cold blood by one of five Black policemen in a blue car when they were trying to stop the march. His step-sister described his movements to the Commission: He was one of the many primary school pupils who were instructed at his school to join the march; when, on one occasion, he wandered away from his step-sister, he was fatally wounded. Two people gave evidence that they had seen an old man lying in the street. He had been shot and was apparently dead. Despite careful investigation the Commission could find no proof of such a case. It appears that only the two boys, Ndhlovu and Peterson, were shot and killed that morning. Later that day, Tsietsi Mashinini addressed returning pupils at the MIHS, and announced that the police had shot and killed two scholars and wounded eleven.

3.6.14 More than one witness said that the peaceful marches would not have degenerated into riots if the police had not started shooting. Others went so far as to contend that, if the police had not intervened at all, there would have been no violence. Those who expressed such opinions did not take the following facts into account: The marches and all those participating in them were not peaceful and orderly at all times. This was an uncontrolled or badly controlled march. Even before the shooting there had been public violence, and it was very probable that violence would occur again. The march was illegal and the police were duty bound to let the crowd disperse, or to disperse them, and later, to quell the rioting. The actions of the police in putting a stop to the illegal march were not the cause of further unrest that afternoon or during the night, although they may have given rise to the violence discussed in the following paragraphs.

3.7 The actions of the scholars after the confrontation.

3.7.1 After the shooting, Col. Kleingeld and his squad, together with the reinforcements, took up a position on a stretch of open land near the spruit. From there they could keep a watch on the crowds. A big march, which had presumably started from the Naledi High School, joined the demonstrators in

front of the OWHS. Together, the crowd advanced to about 500 paces from the police and halted there. They milled around. Apparently it was then decided not to march further to the Orlando Stadium. In smaller and larger groups the demonstrators then moved away from the school along the streets and between the houses. Some scholars returned to their schools. The pupils who arrived at the MIHS were addressed by Tsietsi Mashinini. Here, as has been mentioned, he announced the casualties. He also said that the pupils were not to come to school the next two days, and that they would receive further instructions on Sunday the 20th. He also assured them that he and the other leaders would see to it that Afrikaans was not introduced into the high schools as a medium of instruction. According to Annexure D, this meeting was held at 11h10, but after due consideration of all the circumstances the Commission believes that it did not take place until 12 o'clock. The Commission realises how unwise it may be to draw conclusions on the strength of a short report of the speech, but would nevertheless point out the following: Apparently the pupils had not expected the protest march to interrupt their school attendance for longer than one day, and that is why Mashinini had to instruct them not to come to school the next two days. In the second place, his assurance may be an indication that, so far as the pupils were concerned, the protest was aimed mainly at the supposed plan to make Afrikaans a compulsory medium of instruction in secondary schools. There is no doubt, however, that the organisers had other objectives. Although the slogans on most placards dealt with Afrikaans as a subject and Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, there were other placards and the banner at the MIHS that pointed to broader political protest. The most important aspect of the demonstration was that the organisers succeeded, through the eruption of the dispute about the medium of instruction, in involving thousands of pupils in a concerted protest against education and resistance against the authorities, and got them to take the first steps on a road which, they thought, would lead to the achievement of SASM's goal, the liberation of the Black man in the RSA.

3.7.2 But not all scholars went straight back to their schools or houses after the confrontation. Along the way many of them committed serious acts of violence. It was not possible to find out details of all the cases of violence, and the Commission will discuss only some incidents that occurred shortly after the confrontation and near the OWHS. In paragraph 3.5.7 mention

was made of a stone-throwing attack on a train, but it could not be established whether this occurred before or after the shooting, or whether scholars were involved. In the cases discussed below, the victims were mostly Whites. They had duties to perform in Soweto and not all of them were aware of the warning to leave the area.

3.7.3 Four White women who had gone to deliver fresh vegetables to nursery schools in Soweto left to return to Johannesburg at about 10h45. One of them, Mrs S.A. Carruthers, gave evidence on their experiences on the return journey. They were unaware of the march and the riot, and heard no rifle shots. The route they followed passed close to the OWHS, and it was probably in Pela Street that they found themselves surrounded by a large crowd of rioting juveniles as well as adults. They and their car were immediately attacked with stones. The windows of the vehicle were broken and all four women were fairly seriously injured. The rioters rocked the car and tried to overturn it. The driver however succeeded in driving through the rioting crowd while her passengers protected her with their bodies. They eventually reached the Orlando police station and were taken to hospital for treatment.

3.7.4 Motor vehicles were waylaid and sometimes attacked. A Chinese driving a Kombi with two Black passengers, tried to escape such an attack. He ran over a young Black girl, seriously injuring her. After a while the rioters allowed him to leave. No further particulars of the injured girl were obtainable. At about the same time, stones were thrown at two White men in a lorry. They reached the Orlando bridge unscathed. Two White policemen from Meadowlands, who were not involved in quelling the riots, were engaged in an investigation at the Phefeni bottle store when rioters threw stones at them. One of them sustained minor injuries, and their car was damaged.

3.7.5 Shortly after the shooting, Mr J.H.B. Esterhuizen, a WRAB official, drove along Pela Street in a motor vehicle belonging to the Board. It is not known where he was going, nor is it clear whether the name of the Board was painted on the vehicle. Almost directly opposite the Phomolong clinic, the rioting scholars threw stones at the vehicle and one large stone shattered the windscreen. Some of these scholars were identified as pupils of the MIHS. Ten or so youths dragged Mr Esterhuizen from his car and assaulted him for

about 3 minutes. He was struck with stones and sticks, and left for dead on the ground. Three students fetched a rubbish bin from a house and emptied out hot ash onto him. This is why it was found at the inquest that an attempt had been made to burn his body. A report in a Johannesburg morning newspaper on the 17th read that they had thrown the body into the bin, and that some of them had said: "That is where he belongs". A reporter who observed this attack from nearby, soon afterwards, and not far away from there, saw a White man at the Phefeni bridge speeding away while stones were showered on his car and the windows were broken. The observer testified that he was able to establish that the stone-throwers were not scholars.

3.7.6 In the course of the morning a Black woman and a White girl went to various places in Soweto together. One was a social worker in the employ of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, and the other was Mrs S.J. Lombard, who was at that time still a student doing practical work in connection with her social studies. They were travelling in a car with a GG registration number. They visited offices, private houses and even a school, but saw no signs of tension or unrest, and were not informed of the situation by anyone. Near the Phefeni bridge they came upon a large rioting crowd. Although they turned off and drove along side streets, they could not avoid the scholars. Rioters stopped the car and attacked it with stones. There were shouts of "Kill the White". A youth pressed a knife to the student's throat and others grabbed her handbag and wrist-watch. She was dragged from the car by her hair, and beaten, kicked and scratched. When the social worker spoke to the scholars, they assured her that they did not want to do her any injury, but wanted to kill the White woman. While the social worker was pleading with the rioters for the life of the student, their car was set alight. The social worker managed to calm them down to some extent, and the student was taken to the house of a minister nearby. There she hid behind a cupboard in a room. Not all the rioters were satisfied with this. They surrounded the house and showered stones on it. Later three of the pupils asked to speak to her. She was taken to the living-room and spoke to them there. According to her evidence in the case S v Twala and ten others, *supra*, they wanted to know from her why she should not also be killed like the other White people. Apparently the minister himself then arrived on the scene, and

shortly afterwards the police rescued her; that was about 4 hours after their car had been stopped.

3.7.7 In Annexure D, under the time heading 11h20 on 16 June, there is a fairly detailed description of how a rioting crowd beat Dr L.M. Edelstein, the Chief Welfare Officer of WRAB, to death at the Youth Centre and trapped Mr R.E. Hobkirk, an official, in the building, and then burned the centre down. To that description the Commission wishes to add that later investigations revealed that Mr Hobkirk had not taken refuge in the Sizwe Stores. Another White man, who had been injured and whose name is not known, was rescued from those shops.

3.7.8 The last incident to be mentioned in this connection is the following: A lorry with liquor was stopped by rioters in the vicinity of Phefeni. The liquor was handed out to the bystanders and the vehicle was set alight.

3.7.9 Two questions relating to these incidents are: What gave rise to the series of violent actions, and why should Whites who were not involved have been made to suffer? Witnesses expressed the opinion that the pupils had attacked the Whites to avenge their comrades who had been shot by the police, the representatives of the White community. Three of the cases described above are relevant here. The first is the case of the man who ran over a young girl in his attempt to escape. According to the information available, the crowd wanted to assault him, but when they noticed he was not White but Chinese, they let him go free. Mrs Carruthers who, at the time of her experience, did not yet know of the shooting, was convinced that she and her friends had been attacked because they were White. The social worker asked the rioting scholars why they had decided to kill all the Whites they came across. Her version of their reply was as follows: Their object was to hold a peaceful demonstration; the police intervened, dispersed them with tear-gas and shot at them; when fellow scholars were shot and killed in front of them, they decided to pay the Whites back in the same coin. Nor should the following facts be overlooked: The demonstrators had real or imagined grievances about education matters. They were ready for violence since they were prepared to meet police opposition with violence, many had seen photographs of White ill-treatment, and their march had a potential element of violence.

There were inciters among them. The police stopped them, attacked them with tear-gas and batons, shot at them and killed two of their comrades, while they themselves were endangered. The police thwarted their plans. The Commission is of the opinion that there was no justification for their actions, but that all these factors gave rise to the eruption. The police action and the consequent fury and frustration were the immediate causes of the acts of violence. It cannot be said that police action was responsible for the later riots.

3.8 Continuation of the riots on the 16th.

3.8.1 There are various indications that street urchins and adults joined the marching scholars during the morning. Apparently not many of these outsiders were involved in the demonstration itself. In the subsequent acts of violence observers noticed more adults, and the influence of and part played by destructive tsotsis and adult criminals in the riots that afternoon should not be underestimated. They exploited the situation. Witnesses said that when general disorder prevailed and drunkenness was rife, more adults than young people took part in the looting and arson. On the other hand, in the opinion of the Commission, it would be wrong to place all the blame for the senseless destruction on adults or tsotsis. There is evidence of schoolchildren taking part in the riots, and no proof that the organisers tried at that stage to dissuade the pupils from running amok nor that they dissociated themselves and the pupils from the senseless violence.

3.8.2 Shortly after noon, riots broke out at various places and spread throughout the area. Reinforcements for the police came from surrounding areas and later from even farther afield. An operational office was set up to co-ordinate police actions. High-ranking officers came to the area to help with counter-measures and planning. From time to time trapped people had to be rescued. Where possible, crowds were dispersed and stone-throwers were driven off, and the police made a particular effort to prevent or limit incitement, arson and looting. People were arrested and tear-gas and firearms were used. The disorders raged on and the Divisional Commissioner saw chaos when he went on an inspection flight by helicopter. Large crowds had collected everywhere, buildings and vehicles were burning and a pall of smoke hung over parts of the area.

3.8.3 To sum up, the following may be said of the destruction wrought by the rioters: There were 19 attacks on WRAB bottle stores; some stores were attacked twice or even three times. All windows were broken, doors were broken down, the liquor was destroyed and removed, and fires were started. Large quantities of liquor were distributed among the rioters. Consequently there was drunkenness on a large scale, and this does not exclude the scholars. One witness told how a group of schoolchildren hid liquor in the veld and went there to drink between looting excursions and other acts of lawlessness. But the culprits in this respect were mainly adults and tsotsis. Twelve WRAB office buildings and offices belonging to the advisory boards were attacked; some were burned down. At that stage only three schools were attacked and fires were also started at one hall and one hostel. If the reason for these incidents was the dissatisfaction of the youth with the education system and the authorities, it is not clear why the following buildings were burned down: Four clinics, two libraries, two commercial banks, one post office, three garages and four shops. This list is not complete.

3.8.4 As had been mentioned, four people died in the riots that morning; two of them were Black schoolchildren and the other two were White officials. In the riots during the afternoon and evening eleven people died, four of them under 18. It is impossible to say with any certainty how many of those who died were scholars or tsotsis. All of them died of bullet wounds, and the police were responsible for their deaths. According to the evidence before the Commission and the findings of the inquests, they died as a result of action to quell the riots; some were shot at scenes of arson and looting.

3.9 The actions of the police.

3.9.1 In considering the activities of the police on the 16th, the Commission is mindful of how easy and unfair it could be to censure action or the absence of action with hindsight. Nevertheless, clear signs of brewing unrest during the last few weeks before the 16th were ignored. There were gatherings where the impending danger was discussed and people who knew the situation expressed real fear; there were incidents of violent resistance that testified to mounting tension; there were public warnings of coming disturbances by speakers and writers. Because the police did not realise the importance of these portents, apparently no further or adequate investigation was undertaken.

This is why they were not only unaware of the disturbances to come, but also of when they would take place, so that on the day they were unprepared as regards manpower, equipment and frame of mind. It is difficult to understand how a group of young people could spend three days preparing for a demonstration by 15 000 or more scholars at schools all over Soweto and the police receive the first, incomplete reports only on the evening before the demonstration was to take place. Information that an illegal march on such a scale was being organised would have made anyone who knew the circumstances realise that danger was threatening and would have prompted him to take the necessary measures if it was his duty to do so. The Commission is of the opinion that the police themselves were largely responsible for their ignorance of what was being planned, and therefore also for their own unpreparedness.

3.9.2 Officers learned of the intended action from two sources on Tuesday evening, but the headquarters that had to correlate all similar information heard about it only after the marches had begun. There was no plan of action for the quelling of the riots, and patrols had to be sent out to report on what was happening. The Divisional Commissioner's order to restrict the pupils to their own schools which, in the opinion of certain witnesses, could have prevented the riots or circumscribed them considerably, could not be carried out since almost all the pupils had left their school grounds by the time it was issued. Nor were there enough men to carry out such an order effectively.

3.9.3 By the time other schools had joined each of the three marches, it was realised that the number of demonstrators was so great that the available 300 to 350 members of the police force would not be enough to control the situation. When such large crowds are dispersed the smaller groups that form also have to be kept in check, because uncontrolled they are just as real a threat to peace and order as a big crowd. When the most important means for dispersing the crowd, viz. tear-gas, was used most of the grenades proved to be defective; dogs also proved useless that morning. By the time the reinforcements, the equipment and the helicopters arrived, four people had already died, many had been injured and several buildings were in flames.

3.9.4 The Commission cannot omit to mention that the small group of policemen tried to keep and restore the peace to the best of their ability. Despite the shortage of men and lack of equipment and preparation, they did not panic. They succeeded in rescuing numerous Whites from dangerous situations and in getting others to leave the danger zone. The commanding officer of a unit testified that a small group of very young schoolchildren had been removed from the street in the path of the approaching march. A reporter who had had several interviews with senior police officers in the course of the morning gained the impression that they had not expected the disturbances and were initially not sure how to deal with the threat. Several officers told him that they had certainly not wanted to use force if it could be avoided, especially since so many schoolchildren were involved in the rioting. How they checked the riots has already been dealt with. Once again, the Commission is not going to speculate on what could have happened if the march had reached the stadium and then the education offices.

3.10 Summary of findings.

3.10.1 Organisation.

The Action Committee formed on 13 June at a regional meeting of SASM members carefully planned and carried through the protest march of the 16th.

3.10.2 For a variety of reasons the police did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation and were unaware of the organisers' activities. The organising therefore proceeded unhindered by the police.

3.10.3 The organisers exploited the opposition to the policy on the medium of instruction and the resultant tension. Their task was made easier by the uncompromising application of the policy of officials and the fact that they underestimated this opposition.

3.10.4 Illegality.

The protest march was illegal since the necessary permission had not been applied for and obtained from the WRAB.

3.10.5 It is the responsibility of the police force to keep the peace and maintain law and order; it was therefore the duty of the police to prevent or stop the illegal march.

3.10.6 Various marches which had taken place before the rally and the confrontation had not been peaceful, and the participants had disturbed the peace and quiet. This behaviour, too, made it necessary for the police to intervene.

3.10.7 Early on the morning of the 16th, demonstrators began using the Black Power salute as a shibboleth and a gesture of solidarity and of power and authority.

3.10.8 Neither in their demonstration nor in their acts of violence were the participants acting spontaneously.

3.10.9 Confrontation.

When the police squad arrived in Vilakazi Street at the OWHS, the scholars waved placards and taunted members of the force. They began throwing stones at the police.

3.10.10 The commander of the squad, Col. Kleingeld, did not succeed in giving the crowd an effective order to disperse and to depart from the place. He had no loudhailer to make his voice heard above the noise of the crowd.

3.10.11 The police tried in vain to disperse the crowd with tear-gas. The squad had no device for throwing tear-gas grenades. Of some 10 grenades thrown by hand, only one exploded. Unexploded grenades were thrown back at the police by the rioters. This abortive attempt gave rise to greater dissatisfaction and resistance, and stones were thrown at the police from the front and sides.

3.10.12 The commanding officer fired two warning shots from a pistol. These were the first shots to be fired by the squad that day in quelling the disturbance.

3.10.13 Intensified stone-throwing attacks and the menacing crowd made the squad's position dangerous and the commanding officer was obliged to radio for reinforcements.

3.10.14 To gain time and reduce the threat he ordered an attack on the crowd using both dogs and batons. The dogs were eliminated by the rioters and two of them were beaten to death. The crowd was driven back with batons, but advanced again when the men returned to their vehicles.

3.10.15 The crowd surrounded the police and rained stones on them from all sides. The lives of the members of the squad were in danger.

3.10.16 In his efforts to drive the crowds away or keep them away, Col. Kleingeld fired three more shots from his pistol and 20 shots from an automatic rifle in a few short bursts. None of these shots was aimed directly at the demonstrators.

3.10.17 Various members of the squad fired in desperation, without any order having been given for them to do so.

3.10.18 When the police drove at speed through a gap in the crowd one vehicle was attacked by the rioters. Attempts were made to set it alight.

3.10.19 The police squad stopped the march, but the organisers succeeded in involving thousands of scholars in a demonstration against real and imagined grievances, thus getting them to take the first steps on a road which, they thought, would lead to the liberation of the Black man in the RSA.

3.10.20 Violence committed by demonstrators.

For an hour or two after the confrontation, rioters, mainly young people, committed acts of excessive violence against Whites who were not involved in quelling the riots. Two WRAB officials, one of whom was the chief welfare officer, were beaten to death by rioters. Five women engaged in voluntary welfare work were assaulted and injured. Several car and lorry drivers were stopped and attacked. Some of them were also injured.

3.10.21 With a background of dissatisfaction about grievances, of incitement, preparation for a demonstration and lack of control, scholars were filled with fury and frustration by the police violence that ended the march. This led to acts of violence.

3.10.22 Later riots.

Widespread riots raged on throughout the afternoon and the night. Not only were buildings that were regarded as so-called symbols of oppression burned down and looted, but buildings of clinics, libraries, commercial banks and shops, which an orderly community would want to protect and preserve, were also destroyed by rioters and vandals.

3.10.23 Those who took part in this destruction were adults, lawless street urchins and schoolchildren. The organisers did not dissociate themselves and the schoolchildren from the violence and destruction.

3.10.24 Fifteen people died in the day's rioting. During the rioting that morning, the police shot and killed two scholars. Later, rioting scholars beat two White WRAB officials to death.

3.10.25 Findings on the part played by the police are contained in the following paragraphs of this chapter: 3.2.1 to 4; 3.3.2; 3.6.4 to 14; 3.7.9; 3.8.4 and 3.9.1 to 4. These findings, as well as those contained in the summary, will not be repeated.

CHAPTER 4 : SOWETO FROM 17 JUNE TO 28 FEBRUARY 1977.

4.1 The period of rioting.

4.1.1 The previous day's violence was continued on the 17th of June. Rioting was rampant. When the riots began to abate on the 18th, they had already spread to surrounding areas on the Rand. After a riot-free week-end, isolated incidents occurred on Monday the 21st, and bus services to the area were