C.G.S. | |
| 1 |
It will be convenient to first take the disposition of the Artillery for attack before these operations commenced. There is no doubt that if the Artilleryand the Artillery alonehad been consulted and asked how much Artillery was necessary to attack the front in question they would have said one howitzer, 6-inch or over, for every 50 yards for destructive purposes only; our Northern limit of attack would then have been about LA BOISSELLE with the number of howitzers available. Presuming that this view had been accepted and that the German defences had been totally demolishedas doubtless they would have beenI do not consider that we should have been in a better position today, in fact not so good. The concentration of German Artillery against this limited front would have been terrificour attack had been so well advertised in advance. | |
From results of the attack as it was carried out I do not consider that we are justified in assuming that the greater part of the Artillery should be massed on salients and the intervening spaces neglected, presuming that the Infantry are to advance against the intervening spaces. There is no doubt in my mind that the surest way to success is to follow the system adopted by the French, and that is practically to blot out the whole of the enemy's defences on the front of attack before the infantry are launched. If the intervening spaces between salients are treated lightly our infantry must be in trenches close enough to the enemy to enable them to jump into the enemy's trenches before he has time to bring his maxims out of his dug-outs and man his parapets (see report of damage to XV Corps front defences). So much for operations against well fortified positions. A second phase in the operations is now in progress, and strong points between the Germans' first line and second line must and will be treated with the greatest concentration of fire possible. When these points, now occupied by the enemy, are cleared, the question of attacking the second line must be considered; and I am of opinion that the whole of the second line defence system to be attacked, and at least 1,000 yards on each flank of it, should be demolished before the Infantry its asked to assault. | |
The conditions from the first attack are perfectly different. We have gained the advantage of dispersion on a long front. This has enabled us to reach the second line. We must make absolutely certain of getting through. This will not be done by extreme concentration on salients and neglect of intervening spaces, unless the salients alone are to be seized first and the remainder of front kept under strong fire. | |
Major General, A.A., Adv. G.H.Q,. 9th July, 1916. | 1 |
|